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I. INTRODUCTION

In the broader business law literature, much has been written on the supposed
convergence trend of corporate governance practices. Yet this academic discussion has barely
extended to the professional sports context and in the instances where professional sports
governance has been at issue, stadiums and stadium ownership have not been the subject of
analysis. With stadium construction and renovation projects regularly running into the hundreds
of millions or billions of dollars,1 and ongoing stadium operations and debt repayments on such
facilities often exceeding tens of millions each year,2 stadium governance is a significant aspect
of business and corporate governance worth illuminating. This article aims to contribute to the
closing of this literature gap.
Although there are many prospective paths of inquiry, this study focuses on stadium
ownership structures in four wealthy Anglosphere jurisdictions with a substantial professional
sports and stadium presence: England, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Beginning with
the baseline of the English Premier League as a proxy for England, and continuing with a
comparative examination primarily focused on the National Football League (NFL), Major
League Soccer (MLS), Canadian Football League (CFL), Australian Football League (AFL), and
A-League, this study evaluates 114 stadium ownership structures. After a literature review on
corporate governance convergence trends, stadium finance, and motivations for stadium
construction, I move to a descriptive overview of the stadium holding structure data set. This is
followed by the core discussion of a number of legal influences on stadium ownership as well as
the relationship of stadium ownership to club controlled ancillary real estate development.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Corporate governance policy and trends
The literature concerning corporate governance convergence has primarily focused on
private and publicly traded corporations and the institutional frameworks governing them at the
national and international level.3 Research has broadly concerned the adoption of corporate
governance codes, legal or regulatory reform (such as requirements for outside directors,
disclosure, and minority shareholder protection), and market trends (including CEO options,
takeovers, and institutional investors).4
At the national level, Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu differentiate between de jure and de
facto convergence, with the former referring to institutions and laws and the latter to the practical
implementation of governance.5 Along somewhat similar lines, Gilson divides convergence into
three primary types – functional, formal, and contractual.6 For Gilson, functional convergence
1

JUDITH GRANT LONG, PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR MAJOR LEAGUE SPORTS FACILITIES (2013).
Id at 101.
3
Toru Yoshikawa and Abdul Rasheed, Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review and Future
Directions, 17 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 388 (2009).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 389.
6
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J COMP. L 329
(2001).
2
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entails governance responses within already existing institutional frameworks that are
sufficiently flexible to withstand such changes.7 For institutions without this built in elasticity,
convergence is operationalized though formal means.8 Finally, with institutional arrangements
that are neither internally flexible, nor amenable to change through the political process, there is
contractual convergence.9 The flipside of these convergence concepts – outlined by Meyer and
Rowan,10 and Fiss and Zajac,11 and Yoshikawa and Rasheed12 – is so-called decoupling, whereby
the illusion of convergence is attained or claimed by a country, but the substance of practice does
not support this claim.13
Convergence has been explained at the firm and exchange levels through financial market
integration, portfolio integration, and product market integration.14 Others have focused on the
harmonization of accounting rules and governance codes.15 Still the convergence trend has not
been a one-way flow. Some academics view convergence as being impeded by a lack of
consensus on what the ideal governance regime is in the first place,16 as well as divergent forces
such as path dependency,17 rent seeking interest groups,18 or differing property rights regimes.
Often however, convergence has been framed as moving towards an “Anglo-American” model,
although even within this dominant thread, some have noted significant distinctions.19
In the realm of stadium related corporations there is a somewhat different range of forces
present. Compared to firms in OECD marketplaces generally, and as this article will document,
stadium related corporations are more likely to be state owned enterprises or public-private
partnerships. At the firm level, while there are similar imperatives for implementing transparency
measures, or seeing governance from outside directors, other market issues – such as executive
compensation, takeovers, minority protection, and institutional investors – are for obvious
reasons less present, or absent altogether. At the national level however, there would seem to be
similar incentives for how stadiums should be held: from an efficiency standpoint, success with a
particular model of governance for comparable stadium projects should make a particular public
or private ownership structure more or less common within a country and across national
borders.

7

Id.
Id.
9
Id.
10
John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structures as Myth and Ceremony,
AM. J SOCIOLOGY (1977).
11
Peer C. Fiss and E.J. Zajac, The Diffusion of Ideas Over Contested Terrain: The (Non)adoption of a Shareholder
Value Orientation Among German Firms, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q 504 (2004).
12
Yoshikawa and Rasheed, supra note 3.
13
Id.
14
Yoshikawa and Rasheed, supra note 3.
15
John C. Coffee, The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 641 (1999).
16
Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen, Nationality and ownership structures: The 100 largest companies in six
European nations, MIR: MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 149 (1996).
17
DOUGLASS NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (2005); Yoshikawa and Rasheed,
supra note 3.
18
Coffee, supra note 15.
19
Steven Toms and Mike Wright, Divergence and Convergence within Anglo-American Corporate Governance
Systems: Evidence from the US and UK, 1950–2000, 47 BUSINESS HISTORY 267 (2005).
8
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While the dearth of literature on stadium governance allows for many prospective aspects
through which the subject could be addressed, this project focuses on stadium ownership
structures. At the national level however, there would seem to be similar incentives for how
stadiums should be held: success with a particular governance model for comparable stadium
projects should make a given ownership structure more or less common within and across
borders. While some work has theorized sport partnership governance,20 or the mechanics of
governance in a sport infrastructure context,21 this project focuses on how law influences the
structural landscape of stadium ownership with reference to supposed convergence trends in a
broader corporate governance law literature.
B. Stadium finance
Although there is a significant gap in the literature as it pertains to stadium governance
after the facility development or redevelopment project is complete and the venue is in the
operational phase, much has been written on stadium finance in North America. This aspect of
the literature is important to understanding much of the context surrounding post-construction
governance in the baseline jurisdiction of this paper, England, as well as the three comparator
countries.
In North America, stadiums receive heavy public subsidies. Long’s detailed accounting
of public-private stadium partnerships in North America highlights that public partners paid
almost 64 percent of NFL stadium capital costs between 1990 and 2009.22 There are several
explanations for this subsidization phenomena. First, despite being thoroughly discredited, some
governments might see stadiums as economic boons.23 Second, governments can see stadiums as
agents of urban or neighborhood renewal.24 Even if arguments of net economic gains in a region
fall flat on the face of significant literature to the contrary, more nuanced arguments can be made
that a stadium can rearrange regional economic activity and revitalize a particular geographic
area.25
A third important explanation for North American stadium subsidies is jurisdictional
competition. Building off of Tiebout’s basic theory of local expenditure,26 sports teams and the
stadiums they play in are an amenity that jurisdictions may subsidize in order to compete with
other alternative jurisdictions in which firms and talent may wish to locate.27 This competition is
20

See Ian McDonald, Theorising Partnerships: Governance, Communicative Action and Sport Policy, 34 J SOC.
POL’Y 579 (2005); NEIL KING, SPORT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE (2009); Jonathan Grix & Lesley Phillpots,
Revisiting the ‘Governance Narrative’; ‘Asymmetrical Network Governance’ and the Deviant Case of the Sports
Policy Sector, 26 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 3 (2011); Lesley Phillpots et al., Centralized Grassroots Sport Policy and
‘New Governance’: A Case Study of County Sports Partnerships in the UK–Unpacking the Paradox, 46 INT’L REV.
SOC. SPORT 265 (2011).
21
See Russell Hoye & Matthew Nicholson, Sport Stadia Governance, 13 SPORT MGMT. REV. 171 (2010); Martijn
Van den Hurk & Koen Verhoest, The Governance of Public–Private Partnerships in Sports Infrastructure:
Interfering Complexities in Belgium, 33 INT’L J. PROJECT MGMT. 201 (2015).
22
Long, supra note 1 at 110-115.
23
See ROBERT BAADE AND VICTOR MATHESON, FINANCING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITIES (2011).
24
Id.
25
Mark Rosentraub, Sports Facilities and Urban Redevelopment: Private and Public Benefits and a Prescription for
a Healthier Future, 1 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 212 (2006).
26
Charles M.Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J POLI ECON. 416 (1956).
27
See Kevin Delaney and Rick Eckstein, Local Growth Coalitions, Publicly Subsidized Sports Stadiums, and Social
Inequality." 30 HUMANITY & SOC. 84 (2006).
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effective in attracting such significant public subsidies because of a fourth and related
explanation: the monopoly power and artificial scarcity of professional sports teams in North
America.28 The five major North American sports leagues (MLB, MLS, NBA, NFL, and NHL)
are effective monopolies, which allows the supply of teams to be limited to a level below
demand.29 Combined with the ability for successful relocation of teams, leagues can leverage this
artificially reduced supply to extract substantial stadium subsidies for the privilege of hosting a
team.30
From this status quo of heavy American stadium subsidies for professional sports, a norm
that has been largely matched within the large and rich Anglosphere by Canada and Australia,
one might expect the second largest jurisdiction with the only sports league that can match the
NFL in revenue to also converge to this norm in much the same way convergence has been a
trend in Anglo-American corporate law and governance. However, other factors have proven
more instructive in understanding stadium ownership structures.

III. ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE
The Premier League is the first division of professional soccer in England and Wales.
The League is a private limited company (PLC) with its 20 shares held by its current members.31
Relegated clubs transfer their shares to clubs promoted from the second division Championship
at the end of the season.32 Unlike North American leagues, European soccer leagues such as the
Premier League operate on a promotion and relegation system whereby bottom finishers are
relegated to the second division league and an equal number of top finishers are promoted to the
first division.
To evaluate stadium holding structures in England, this study focuses on the Premier
League. However, given the promotion and relegation structure, it is necessary to evaluate teams
beyond the current composition of the Premier League. To this end, I have collected a data set of
34 soccer stadiums in England and Wales. This data set includes stadiums in three primary
categories: the stadium of every Premier League club for the 2017-2018 season, the stadiums of
clubs relegated in the previous three years, as well as stadiums of clubs that participated in the
Premier League in three of the previous ten seasons. For these last two categories, only stadiums
with a capacity of at least 20,000 were included. In addition to the three primary categories, I
have included the national team’s home, Wembley, the largest stadium in the country.
The data set includes select clubs beyond the current makeup of the Premier League to
capture the dynamics of promotion and relegation – namely to analyze if there are trends specific
to clubs that have regularly been in the promotion (Championship to Premier League) and
relegation (Premier League to Championship) zones. Indeed the most commonly listed business
risk in the financial statements for clubs outside of the so-called “top six” in the Premier League

28

Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989).
Id.
30
Id.
31
About the Premier League, ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE, https://www.premierleague.com/about.
32
Id.
29
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(Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, and Tottenham) was
relegation and the substantial loss of revenues associated with relegation.
For each stadium in the data set, I collected three key variables: the ultimate owner of the
stadium, the stadium’s corporate structure, and the original purpose for which the stadium was
constructed or, in the case of older facilities, substantially renovated. To collect the first two
variables, I ascertained the financial statements for each club in this data set from Companies
House.33 A primary benefit of centering this study on England is that all firms must make their
financial statements publicly available through Companies House.
From reviewing the notes in the most recent financial statements, I was able isolate the
ultimate controlling parties of the clubs, whether the stadium was owned by the same corporation
as the team, as well as the general holding structure of club and stadium. If this review revealed
that stadium and club ownership was not one and the same, the notes typically also described
controlling companies as well as companies that the club company itself had controlling interests
in. If the club-controlled entities were not related to the stadium holding firm, then the notes
generally showed what firm or entity the club was leasing the stadium from. For the third
variable, a review of media sources and official stadium websites provided historical overview of
the stadium and the primary reasons motivating stadium construction.
Table 1. English Premier League stadium ownership structures
Stadium

Capacity†

Owner

Structure

Purpose

Ancillary

Club

Dev.

Control

Anfield

54,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

No

No

Ashton Gate

27,000

Club

PLCD; within
holding

Club

Yes

No

bet365 Stadium

30,000

Club

PLCS;
subsidiary

Club

Yes

No

Bolton Stadium

28,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

Yes

Yes

Cardiff City Stadium

32,000

Club

PLCD;

Club

Yes

Yes

Carrow Road

27,000

Club

PLCD;

Club

Yes

No

Craven Cottage

25,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

No

No

DW Stadium

25,000

Club

PLCD; lease
land

Club

Yes

No

Emirates Stadium

60,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

Yes

Yes

Etihad Stadium

54,000

City

Direct city
owned

C’wealth
Games

Yes

Yes

Falmer/AMEX

30,000

Club

PLCS;
subsidiary

Club

No

No

33

Companies House, DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/.
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Table 1. English Premier League stadium ownership structures
Stadium

Capacity†

Owner

Structure

Purpose

Ancillary

Club

Dev.

Control

Goodison Park

39,000

Club

PLCS;
subsidiary

Club

No

No

KCOM Stadium

25,000

City

Direct city
owned

Club

No

No

King Power Stadium

32,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

Yes

Yes

Kirklees Stadium

24,000

JV

PLC

Club, rugby

Yes

Yes

Liberty

20,000

City

Direct city
owned

Club, rugby

Yes

No

London Stadium

60,000

City, Public
Development
Corp

LLP

Olympics

Yes

No

Madejski Stadium

24,000

Club

PLCD

Club

Yes

Yes

Molineux Stadium

31,000

Club

PLCD; within
holding

Club

No

No

Old Trafford

75,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

No

No

Pride Park

33,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

Yes

Yes

Riverside Stadium

34,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

No

No

Selhurst Park

26,000

Club

PLCD;

Club

Yes

No

Stadium of Light

48,000

Club

PLCD; within
holding

Club

No

No

Stamford Bridge

41,000

Nonprofit

PLCS§;
subsidiary

Club

No

No

St Andrews Stadium

29,000

Club

PLCD; within
holding

Club

No

No

St James' Park

52,000

City

Direct city
owned

Club

No

No

St Mary's Stadium

32,000

Club

PLCS;
subsidiary

Club

No

No

The Hawthorns

26,000

Club

PLCD;

Club

No

No

Tottenham Hotspur
Stadium

62,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

Yes

Yes

Turf Moor

21,000

Club

PLCD

Club

No

No

Vicarage Road

21,000

Club

PLCD;
subsidiary

Club

No

No
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Table 1. English Premier League stadium ownership structures
Stadium

Capacity†

Owner

Structure

Purpose

Ancillary

Club

Dev.

Control

Villa Park

42,000

Club

PLCD; within
holding

Club

No

No

Wembley

90,000

FA

PLCD‡

England, FA
Cup

Yes

No

†: Stadium capacities in all tables are rounded to the nearest thousand.
‡: Private Limited Company Direct: PLC directly holding stadium and club.
§: Private Limited Company Separate: Stadium PLC separate from club PLC.

A. Findings
Out of the 34 Premier League stadiums covered in this study, 27 are owned by a PLC that
also holds the primary tenant, or a PLC that is ultimately controlled by the same party as the
club. Within these 27, there are four primary subcategories. The first, seen in five instances, is
where the stadium is directly held by a holding company and the club PLC is a subsidiary of the
holding company (Sunderland’s Stadium of Light, Villa Park, Molineux Stadium, and Ashton
Gate). The second category represents stadiums held in a PLC separate from the club, but both
the stadium company and the club company are subsidiaries of the same parent. Four stadiums
are held this way.
The third category includes PLCs where the stadium is held by the same company as the
club, and this unified firm is not a subsidiary of another controlling company, but rather
controlled by natural person shareholders. Six stadiums have this structure, in addition to
Wembley (National) Stadium being held by the Football Association PLC. These six stadiums
are in the lower range of capacity and their associated clubs are more prone to relegation from
the Premier League or bottom 10 results (out of 20 clubs). Also closely related to this category is
Wigan’s DW Stadium, where the only substantial difference is that the land the stadium is built
upon is leased.
Finally, the fourth category is where the stadium is held by the same PLC as the club, but
the unified company is a subsidiary of another holding firm. With 10 stadiums, this is the most
common form of stadium ownership in the data set. Two of the clubs in this category,
Manchester United and Arsenal, have publicly traded share capital, although both also have clear
controlling parties. This is also the most popular form of stadium holding for “top six” clubs
(three of six), although the structure is seen throughout the data set.
The remaining stadiums are a hodgepodge of holding structures arising from a range of
stadium construction purposes. Perhaps most interesting however is the unique structure of
Chelsea Stadium Limited (the owner of Stamford Bridge) and the naming rights of Chelsea
Football Club, which are both subsidiaries of Chelsea Pitch Owners, a non-profit PLC created in
the early 1990s with the intent of preventing property redevelopment of the land upon which
Stamford Bridge resides. Chelsea Football Club, now owned by billionaire Roman Abramovich,
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has a 199-year lease for nominal rent. Under Abramovich, Chelsea has transformed from a
Premier League also-ran into a champion and one of the world’s wealthiest clubs. Although the
club made an offer to Chelsea Pitch Owners to purchase the stadium and land, the fan
shareholders declined this proposal.
Etihad Stadium, owned by the Manchester City Council, was constructed primarily for
the Commonwealth Games and to be repurposed thereafter as a replacement for Manchester
City’s Maine Road.34 When the project and lease were contemplated, Manchester City was a
lower half of the Premier League club that would not have had the financial means for a new
facility. Like Chelsea, new ownership has since made the club into a champion and one of the
world’s elite,35 and new television contracts have transformed the finances of the Premier League
more generally.
London Stadium was a similar legacy and conversion project from the 2012 Olympics.
The stadium is ultimately owned by the City of London through a development corporation
tasked with redeveloping the Olympic Park, and is leased to West Ham United.36 As with Etihad
Stadium, the facility likely would not have been constructed in the location, configuration, and
timeframe it was but-for the Olympic Games.
In Newcastle, St James’ Park has been owned by City Council for decades. With the
council-owned KCOM in Hull and Liberty in Swansea, these stadiums were substantially
publicly financed, largely because councils desired a new stadium as a public good and the clubs
at the time of construction had insufficient financial means.37 A similar situation existed in
Huddersfield, although Kirklees Stadium is a joint venture held 40 percent by each of the local
council, the football club, with the remaining 20 percent owned by a rugby club.38 Generally
however, with the influx of revenue and wealthier owners into the Premier League and
Championship within the past decade, extracting public welfare might become even rarer than it
has been relative to what is seen in North America.

IV. STADIUM OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA,
AND AUSTRALIA
Stadium governance in English soccer is perhaps best contextualized through comparison
to the three large and wealthy English-speaking countries in the world outside of the United
Kingdom: the US, Canada, and Australia. As we will see in this section, despite similar corporate

34

Steve Wilson, How Manchester City Won the Stadium Lottery, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 13, 2011),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/manchester-city/8257210/How-Manchester-City-won-the-stadiumlottery.html.
35
Id.
36
Owen Gibson, How West Ham Struck the Deal of the Century with Olympic Stadium Move, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
14, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/apr/14/west-ham-deal-century-olympic-stadium.
37
See KCOM Stadium, About the KCOM Stadium, http://kcomstadium.com/about-the-kcom-stadium; Rachel Jones,
New Deal for Swansea's Liberty Stadium, (Nov. 17, 2017), https://businessnewswales.com/new-deal-swanseasliberty-stadium/.
38
David Conn, Huddersfield's Community Stadium Dream Sours in Ownership Wrangle, THE GUARDIAN (May 5,
2009), https://www.theguardian.com/global/2009/may/06/huddersfield-town
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laws and histories,39 and a documented convergence trend within the broader realm of corporate
governance, this convergence trend has not extended to stadium governance.
For each stadium I collected the same variables as with the England data set: the ultimate
owner, the stadium’s corporate structure, and the original purpose for which the stadium was
constructed or substantially renovated, whether there is ancillary development or club controlled
ancillary development. Without the benefit of equivalent sources to Companies House, I used a
combination of websites from teams, stadiums, stadium authorities, as well as sub-federal
governments. I also accessed summaries from the National Sports Law Institute. Where public
financial statements were available, these were likewise employed.
A. United States
In the US, the National Football League is the best comparator to the English Premier
League as opposed to Major League Soccer – similar to the Premier League, the NFL is the
dominant professional sports league and the two leagues are the world’s largest in revenue terms.
One issue with using the NFL as a comparator is that the NFL has far more competitive and
financial parity than the Premier League due in large part to the NFL salary cap and draft. Indeed
at the bottom range of this data set, there are perhaps more commonalities with MLS – the level
of play in MLS is sometimes compared to that of the English Championship and the soccer
specific stadiums in MLS are similar in size to those seen in the Championship or with less
wealthy Premier League clubs (capacities in the 18,000-25,000 range).
Thus, I have built data sets of the 2018 permanent NFL stadiums as well as soccer
specific MLS stadiums for US teams (there are three MLS stadiums included in the Canadian
discussion). The temporary NFL stadiums in Los Angeles and the planned stadium in Las Vegas
are excluded from the NFL set, while non-soccer specific stadiums are excluded from the MLS
set (although several MLS teams play in NFL stadiums).
1. National Football League
The NFL has a traditional North American franchise structure, although the league
formally considers itself a trade association with 32 member teams held by private owners. 24 of
29 permanent NFL stadiums in 2018 are publicly owned. Of these 24 publicly owned stadiums,
four are directly held by a municipal government, four are owned by counties, one is jointly held
by a city and county (the Oakland Coliseum), 14 are owned by public authorities, and one
(Soldier Field) by a conventional agency (the Chicago Park District).
Starting with the most common structure, a public authority is a (typically state)
government created agency for the purpose of participating in the economy. Extremely common
in the US, public authorities differ from conventional agencies in that they are not directly
accountable to elected officials and can operate outside of many state government norms.40
These authorities have corporate powers and are governed by boards appointed for varying terms
by elected officials. Many authorities are purpose-built stadium authorities, while others are

39

Andrew Lilico, In the Trump Era, the Plan for a Canadian-U.K.-Australia-New Zealand Trade Alliance is
Quickly Catching on, FINANCIAL POST (Feb. 13, 2017), http://business.financialpost.com/opinion/in-the-trump-erathe-plan-for-a-canadian-u-k-australia-new-zealand-trade-alliance-is-quickly-catching-on.
40
See Jerome J. Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 553 (1957).
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merged with tourism or convention authorities. In some cases, stadium or tourism authorities
also govern a Major League Baseball (MLB) stadium.
Table 2. NFL stadium ownership structures
Stadium

Capacity

City

Owner

Structure†

Ancillary
Dev.

Club
Control

Arrowhead
Stadium

76,000

Kansas City

Jackson County
Sports Complex
Authority

Public authority

No

No

AT&T
Stadium

80,000

Arlington

City of Arlington

City

No

No

Bank of
America
Stadium

75,000

Charlotte

Panthers Stadium
LLC

LLCS

No

No

Century Link
Field

68,000

Seattle

Washington State
Stadium
Authority

Public authority

Yes

Yes

FedEx Field

82,000

Landover

Dan Snyder

LLCD

No

No

FirstEnergy
Stadium

67,000

Cleveland

City of Cleveland

City

No

No

Ford Field

65,000

Detroit

Detroit Wayne
County Stadium
Authority

Public authority

Yes

Yes

Gillette
Stadium

66,000

Foxborough

Kraft Group

LLCD

Yes

Yes

Hard Rock
Stadium

65,000

Miami
Gardens

South Florida
Stadium LLC

LLCS

No

No

Heinz Field

68,000

Pittsburgh

Sport and
Exhibition
Authority of
Pittsburgh and
Allegheny
County

Public authority

No

No

Lambeau Field

81,000

Green Bay

City of Green
Bay/Brown
County

City, County

Yes

Yes

Levi's Stadium

68,000

Santa Clara

Santa Clara
Stadium
Authority

Public authority

Yes

Yes

Lincoln
Financial Field

69,000

Philadelphia

City of
Philadelphia

City

No

No

Lucas Oil
Stadium

67,000

Indianapolis

Indiana Stadium
Authority

Public authority

No

No

M&T Bank
Stadium

71,000

Baltimore

Maryland
Stadium
Authority

Public authority

No

No
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Table 2. NFL stadium ownership structures
Stadium

Capacity

City

Owner

Structure†

Ancillary
Dev.

Club
Control

MercedesBenz
Superdome

73,000

New Orleans

Louisiana
Stadium and
Exposition
District

Public authority

No

No

MercedesBenz Stadium

71,000

Atlanta

Georgia World
Congress Center
Authority

Public authority

No

No

Met Life
Stadium

82,000

East
Rutherford

MetLife Stadium
Company

LLCS

No

No

New Era Field

71,000

Orchard Park

Erie County

County

No

No

Nissan
Stadium

69,000

Nashville

Nashville County

County

No

No

NRG Stadium

72,000

Houston

Harris County Houston Sports
Authority

Public authority

No

No

Oakland
Coliseum

53,000

Oakland

OaklandAlameda County
Stadium
Authority

Public authority

No

No

Paul Brown
Stadium

65,000

Cincinnati

Hamilton County

County

Yes

No

Raymond
James Stadium

65,000

Tampa

Hillsborough
County

County

No

No

Soldier Field

61,000

Chicago

Chicago Park
District

Public agency

No

No

Sports
Authority Field

76,000

Denver

Metropolitan
Football Stadium
District

Public authority

No

No

TIAA Bank
Field

67,000

Jacksonville

City of
Jacksonville

City

No

No

University of
Phoenix
Stadium

63,000

Glendale

Arizona Sports
and Tourism
Authority

Public authority

Yes

No

US Bank
Stadium

66,000

Minneapolis

Minnesota Sports
Facilities
Authority

Public authority

Yes

No

†: LLCS: Limited Liability Corporation, Subsidiary; LLCD: Limited Liability
Corporation, Directly Owned
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2. Major League Soccer
MLS is the first division of soccer in the US and Canada. A legacy product of the 1994
World Cup, MLS is largely reliant on gate attendance for revenues.41 As of the 2018 season,
there will be 15 MLS soccer specific stadiums in the US. Of these 15, eight are publicly owned.
Unlike the NFL where public authorities are the most common, only Houston’s MLS stadium is
held by a public authority, which also owns three other major league stadiums in the city.
Another, Philadelphia’s stadium in suburban Chester, is held by the county. In Chester’s case,
the city has been in various forms of receivership42 and was likely not deemed by the state or
county to be an appropriate holding vehicle. Besides these two instances, the remainder of
publicly owned MLS stadiums are held by municipalities.
For the seven stadiums that are privately held, the unique single-entity structure of MLS
adds structural wrinkle. Under US antitrust law, a deemed “single-entity” cannot conspire with
itself to restrain trade and is thus incapable of violating antitrust law.43 For a professional sports
league, this status would provide a distinct advantage in collective bargaining.44 As a relatively
recent invention conceptualized with this strategic objective in mind, this means that all MLS
clubs are formally owned by the league (the single-entity), and the local operating groups
actually own a share in the league instead of a franchise.45 However private stadiums are
typically held by separate companies owned by the holders of local MLS operating rights – thus
the ultimate controlling parties are generally one and the same despite the contortion of the MLS
governance structure.
Table 3. MLS stadium ownership structures
Stadium

Capacity

City

Owner

Owner
structure†

Ancillary

Club

Dev.

Control

Audi Field

20,000

District of
Columbia

District of
Columbia

City

Yes

Yes

Avaya Stadium

18,000

San Jose

San Jose
Earthquakes

LLCD

Yes

Yes

Banc of
California
Stadium

22,000

Los Angeles

LAFC Sports

LLCD

No

No

BBVA Compass
Stadium

22,000

Houston

Harris CountyHouston Sports
Authority

County/Public
authority

Yes

No

41

John C. Bradbury, Determinants of Attendance in Major League Soccer, 34 J. SPORT MGMT. (2020) at 53.
Municipalities Financial Recovery Plan for the City of Chester, ECONSULT SOLUTIONS, (Jul. 15, 2016),
http://www.chestercity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/FILED_Financial_Recovery_Plan_Chester_07152016.pdf.
43
Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status
Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991) at 27-28.
44
Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor
Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L. J. 19 (1986).
45
Terry Brennan, How MLS’ Single Entity Status Works and its Relationship With Antitrust Law, LAW IN SPORT,
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/item/how-mls-single-entity-status-works-and-itsrelationship-with-antitrust-law.
42
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Table 3. MLS stadium ownership structures
Stadium

Capacity

City

Owner

Owner
structure†

Ancillary

Club

Dev.

Control

Children's
Mercy Park

18,000

Kansas City,
Ks

Kansas Unified
Development
LLC

LLCS

No

No

Dick's Sporting
Goods Park

18,000

Commerce
City, Co

City of
Commerce City

City

Yes

Yes

Mapfre Stadium

19,000

Columbus

Precourt Sports
Ventures LLC

City

No

No

Orlando City
Stadium

25,000

Orlando

Orlando Sports
Holdings

LLCS

No

No

Providence Park

21,000

Portland

City of Portland

City

Yes

No

Red Bull Arena

25,000

Harrison, NJ

Hudson County
Improvement
Authority

Public authority

Yes

No

Rio Tinto
Stadium

20,000

Sandy, Ut

Utah Soccer
LLC

LLCD

No

No

StubHub Center

27,000

Carson, Ca

AEG

LLCS

No

No

Talen Energy
Stadium

18,000

Chester, Pa

Delaware
County

County

Yes

Yes

Toyota Park

20,000

Bridgeview,
Il

Village of
Bridgeview

City

No

No

Toyota Stadium

20,000

Frisco, Tx

City of Frisco

City

Yes

No

†: LLCS: Limited Liability Corporation, Subsidiary; LLCD: Limited Liability
Corporation, Directly Owned

B. Canada
In Canada, most large outdoor stadiums are for the Canadian Football League.46 The CFL
is a nine team franchise structured league similar to the NFL with six current teams owned by
private parties and three by non-profit community organizations.47 As with MLS, there have
been instances of one owner controlling multiple teams, and a history of financial and fan base
difficulties.48 Most CFL salary expenses are now covered by its national television contract, but

46

See Table 4.
Dan Ralph, CFL Asking Federal Government for up to $150 Million in Financial Assistance, WINNIPEG FREE
PRESS (April. 28, 2016), https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/sports/football/cfl/cp-newsalert-cfl-askinggovernment-for-up-to-150-million-in-financial-aid-570025142.html.
48
Cam Cole, TV Deal Keeps CFL Afloat as League Suffers From Diminished Ratings, Alarming Attendance Figures
in Some Markets, NATIONAL POST (Nov. 20, 2015), http://nationalpost.com/sports/football/cfl/tv-deal-keeps-cflafloat-as-league-suffers-from-diminished-ratings-alarming-attendance-figures-in-some-markets.
47
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profitability is substantially determined by gate receipts.49 The league’s popularity is traditionally
strongest in its prairie markets (Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, and Winnipeg).50
CFL stadiums generally range in capacity from 20,000 to 60,000, and the average CFL
game attendance is around 25,000.51 There are also two stadiums shared between CFL and MLS
teams, and one soccer specific MLS stadium. Also included in this 12 facility data set is Rogers
Centre, which has become a Major League Baseball only venue, but was the long-time home of
the Toronto Argonauts CFL team, and Montreal Olympic Stadium, now used for certain playoff
CFL or MLS games, but previously home to the MLB Expos and CFL Alouettes.
Of the 12 stadiums, only two are privately held. Stade Saputo, a soccer specific stadium
in Montreal, was initially privately financed (although the MLS renovation was funded by the
Quebec government) and is owned by the Saputo family, operators of the MLS club.52 Rogers
Centre in Toronto was originally the provincially owned SkyDome, but was sold to Rogers
Communications, the publicly traded communications behemoth and owners of the Blue Jays, in
2005.53 A third stadium, Investors Group Field in Winnipeg, is a joint venture corporation held
by four parties: the province, the city, the team, and the University of Manitoba (on whose
campus the facility is located).54
The involvement of public universities as owners of stadiums where professional sports
are the primary revenue activity is also seen in Calgary and Montreal (Molson Stadium at McGill
University). While many American public universities own professional-sized American football
stadiums, these are not shared with NFL teams except on a temporary basis (such as in
Minneapolis and Los Angeles). In Canada however, with major public universities often located
in major cities, the university/professional football stadium is a sensible dual-purpose structure.
The most common stadium holding structure in Canada is municipal ownership, with five
facilities under this heading. The remaining two stadiums, BC Place and Montreal Olympic
Stadium, are owned through provincial crown corporations.55 A provincial crown corporation in
Canada is akin to a state public authority in the US – while reporting to a political ministry,
crown corporations are somewhat insulated from political interference and can participate in the
broader economy.56

49

Id.
Rob Williams, Outspoken BC Lions Player Makes Fun of CFL Attendance, OFFSIDE VANCOUVER (Sep. 18, 2019),
https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/bc-lions-duron-carter-cfl-attendance.
51
See Table 4.
52
Stade Saputo, Impact Montreal, https://www.impactmontreal.com/en/stadium/stade-saputo.
53
Emma McIntosh, 12 Years Ago, the Rogers Centre Was Just the SkyDome, TORONTO STAR (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/02/02/12-years-ago-the-rogers-centre-was-just-the-skydome.html.
54
Bartley Kives, Final Cost of Investors Group Field Expected to be $384M, CBC NEWS (Jun. 20, 2016),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/investors-stadium-cost-1.3639529.
55
See PavCo, http://www.bcpavco.com/resources/reports/; Régie des installations olympiques, Quebec,
http://www4.gouv.qc.ca/fr/Portail/citoyens/programme-service/Pages/Info.aspx?sqctype=mo&sqcid=220.
56
Kazi Stastna, What Are Crown Corporations and Why Do They Exist?, CBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/what-are-crown-corporations-and-why-do-they-exist-1.1135699.
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Table 4. Stadium ownership structures in Canada
Stadium

Capacity City

Owner

Structure

Purpose of stadium

BC Place

54,000

Vancouver

PavCo

Public
Authority

Attract
MLB/Olympics/CFL/MLS

BMO Field

30,000

Toronto

City of Toronto

City

MLS

Commonwealth
Stadium

56,000

Edmonton

City of Edmonton

City

Commonwealth Games

Investors Group
Field

33,000

Winnipeg

Triple B Stadium
Inc.

Non-profit
corp.

CFL

McMahon Stadium

46,000

Calgary

University of
Calgary

University

University/CFL

Molson Stadium

25,000

Montreal

McGill University

University

University/CFL

Mosaic Stadium

33,000

Regina

City of Regina

City

CFL

Olympic Stadium

66,000

Montreal

Régie des
installations
olympiques

Public
Authority

Olympics/MLB/CFL

Rogers Centre

53,000

Toronto

Rogers
Communications

Private corp.;
public traded

MLB

Stade Saputo

20,000

Montreal

Saputo Inc.

Private corp.

MLS

TD Place

24,000

Ottawa

City of Ottawa

City

CFL

Tim Hortons Field

24,000

Hamilton

City of Hamilton

City

CFL/Pan Am Games

C. Australia
The Australian data set covers 24 stadiums used in the Australian Football League and
the A-League, the first division of Australian soccer. Australian stadiums are generally at least
dual purpose, with the most common sharing occurring in rectangular stadiums between soccer
and rugby clubs, and oval stadiums between AFL and cricket teams.57 This said, there are other
varieties of crossover league and sport sharing. However, including two of four leagues provides
a representative sample, and makes for a better comparison with Canada (with the AFL being a
natural comparator for the CFL), and the soccer specific stadiums of MLS. It is also common for
the largest cities – Sydney and Melbourne – to have multiple teams in the same league, often in
different stadiums.
Of the nine A-League stadiums included, only one is privately held. Three of the eight
public stadiums are directly owned by the state government, while another three are owned
through state government authorities, one by a public trust, and one by a city council. The AFL

57

See Table 5.
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stadium story is much the same. Here state governments directly own eight stadiums, one is
owned by a state government authority, one is held by a trust, and four by city councils.58
State governments are the dominant players in Australian stadiums. Roughly half of
state-controlled stadiums are owned directly, but New South Wales and Western Australia have
placed ownership in purpose-built stadium crown corporations, akin to those seen in some
Canadian provinces. However, with the exception of Sydney stadiums related to the 2000
Olympics, most new or major renovation stadium projects were primarily intended to play host
to at least two professional sports. Interestingly, the only non-government owned stadiums are
owned by either the national or regional sections of the AFL.
Like MLS, Australian leagues also have unique structures at the league and club level
worth noting. The AFL, the stronger and higher revenue of the two Australian leagues discussed,
is directly governed by an independent commission with commission members selected by
clubs.59 The commission grants licenses to clubs for the right to operate within the league. Most
clubs are held as non-profit corporations, controlled by a broad member shareholder base and
governed by a board of directors,60 while other clubs are held by regional bodies of Australian
Rules Football. Attendance in the AFL is strong (over 30,000 per game)61 and most clubs are
profitable. Profits, however, are reinvested by clubs into growing the game locally.
The ten team A-League, launched in 2004, is owned by the Australian Football
Federation (AFF). As with the AFL Commission, the AFF licenses operating rights to clubs.62
With the A-League however, clubs are privately owned, and profits are retained privately. ALeague attendance lags that of the AFL and is the weakest of the leagues covered in this paper,
with average game attendances of 11,000-15,000. This said, A-League attendance is not too far
off MLS (19,000 in 2014) or the English Championship (20,000 in 2016/17).

Table 5. AFL and A-League stadium ownership structures in Australia
A-League
stadiums

Capacity

City

Owner

Structure

Purpose of stadium

AAMI Park

30,000

Melbourne

Victoria

State Gov.

Soccer/rugby

Allianz Stadium

45,000

Sydney

Sydney Cricket
Ground Trust

Trust

Soccer/rugby

ANZ Stadium

83,000

Sydney

Venues NSW

State Gov. Auth.

Olympics

Central Coast
Stadium

20,000

Gosford

Central Coast
Council

City

Soccer/rugby

58

Id.
Corporate Governance, Concise Financial Report,
http://s.afl.com.au/staticfile/AFL%20Tenant/AFL/Files/AFL%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf.
60
JULIE FOREMAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE AUSTRALIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE: A CRITICAL EVALUATION
(2006) at 8.
61
Attendances (1921-2017), AFL TABLES, https://afltables.com/afl/crowds/summary.html.
62
Dominic Bossi, How A-League Expansion Will Work and Why Promotion and Relegation Can be Forgotten,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 21 2016), https://www.smh.com.au/sport/soccer/how-aleague-expansion-willwork-and-why-promotion-and-relegation-can-be-forgotten-20161021-gs7g0r.html.
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Table 5. AFL and A-League stadium ownership structures in Australia
A-League
stadiums

Capacity

City

Owner

Structure

Purpose of stadium

Etihad Stadium

56,000

Melbourne

AFL

Non-profit corp.

AFL/soccer

Hindmarsh
Stadium

16,000

Adelaide

South Australia

State Gov.

Soccer/rugby

McDonald
Jones Stadium

33,000

Newcastle

Venues NSW

State Gov. Auth.

Soccer/rugby

nib Stadium

20,000

Perth

Venues West

State Gov. Auth.

Soccer/rugby

Suncorp
Stadium

52,000

Brisbane

Queensland

State Gov.

Soccer/rugby

AFL
stadiums

Capacity

City

Owner

Structure

Purpose of stadium

Adelaide Oval

53,000

Adelaide

South Australia

State Gov.

Cricket

Bellerive Oval

20,000

Hobart

Clarence City
Council

City

Cricket/AFL

Carrara
Stadium

25,000

Gold Coast

Queensland

State Gov.

AFL

Cazaly's
Stadium

12,000

Cairns

AFL Cairns

Non-profit corp.

AFL

Eureka Stadium

11,000

Wendouree

City of Ballarat

City

Cricket/AFL

Kardinia Park

34,000

Geelong

Kardinia Park
Stadium Trust

Trust

AFL/soccer

Manuka Oval

15,000

Canberra

Australian
Capital
Territory Gov.

State Gov.

Cricket/AFL/rugby

Marrara Oval

12,000

Darwin

Northern
Territory

State Gov.

AFL

Melbourne
Cricket Ground

100,000

Melbourne

Victoria

State Gov.

Cricket

Perth Stadium

60,000

Perth

Western
Australia

State Gov.

Four sports

Sydney Cricket
Ground

48,000

Sydney

Venues NSW

State Gov. Auth.

Cricket

Sydney
Showground
Stadium

25,000

Sydney

NSW

State Gov.

Olympics/AFL

The Gabba

42,000

Brisbane

Queensland

State Gov.

Cricket

Traeger Park

10,000

Alice Springs

Alice Springs
Town Council

City

AFL/cricket

York Park

20,000

Launceston

Launceston City
Council

City

AFL/cricket
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V. DISCUSSION

A. Corporate, antitrust, tax, European law, and risk management considerations
The countries discussed generally best represent the Anglo-American stream in legal and
corporate thought. If firm and asset holding structures in these countries can be seen as broadly
reminiscent, or at least among the most similar in the developed world, then the natural
hypothesis is that stadium holding structures should also converge based on similar streams of
corporate and regulatory thought. Instead, differences often dictate.
Starting with England, the key takeaway is that the overwhelming majority of recent
Premier League stadiums – 26 of 34 – share common corporate ownership with the club playing
in them.63 In all of these instances, the reason for building or substantially renovating the stadium
was to host the club. The English level of club stadium ownership is unprecedented in this study.
The primary difference in England relative to the US is that there is no restriction on the
supply of clubs and club fan bases are strongly tied to a city, or even an area of a city. This
means that prospective owners have many options on which clubs to purchase and once
purchased, they can invest in as much talent as they wish to gain promotion (subject to Financial
Fair Play regulation). Instead of stadium related revenues, the business play for new owners is
the lucrative television rights shared between Premier League clubs. Thus, not only is there less
of a scope for relocation, the traditional benefit of relocation – a new publicly funded stadium –
is far less important.
Further, restrictions on state aid under European Union law would make stadium
subsidies prima facie illegal provision of state resources distorting or threatening to distort
competition.64 Although there are potential exemptions for one-time financial distress, common
European interest, cultural development, or economic development in distressed regions, as
construed through stadium related decisions by the European Commission, these are unlikely to
apply to current Premier League teams. Common interest or cultural development – which the
body of European Commission decisions has allowed in instances of national stadiums where the
facility will develop the game – would be hard to see as being applied to top division stadiums
given both the localized impact of the team and the highly developed nature of the English game,
except in circumstances where the stadium results from a mega-event such as the Olympics.
Economic development is a more viable route in certain circumstances where the location
is distressed, but this has not yet been tested in the post-Lisbon Treaty English context. However,
instances of publicly funded and owned stadiums in distressed places such as Hull, indicate that a
limited class of potential facilities can successfully find exemption from state aid restrictions.
Likewise, the necessity of one-time aid to a failing club is hard to foresee in light of the Premier
League’s record television revenues. Still with impending Brexit, European derived limits on
state aid may disappear altogether.
Where the stadium and club are not ultimately owned by the same parties, there is
divergence in how the stadium is owned and for what purpose it was built. Facilities such as
Etihad and London Stadium are mega-event legacies where clubs were able to attain favorable
63

See Table 1.
European Commission, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Part Three – Title VII Chapter 1
Section 2 Article 107. (ntd. Bluebook was unclear on proper citation for EU Treaty)
64
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lease terms in order for the public to salvage some significant use. Yet despite being the ultimate
respective owners of similarly sized athletics turned soccer stadiums, Manchester and London
have selected different governance paths. Likewise, Hull, Swansea, and Hudderfield are smaller
centers with smaller clubs with city councils that have chosen to substantially cover stadium
investments. The commonality is that substantial public capital contributions have been made
where the public sector has wanted the stadium more than the private sector’s desire or capacity
to pay at the time.
With the monopoly driven incentives for subsidization not present, one might
hypothesize that structures would be driven by the next strongest business considerations,
namely tax minimization. Yet if a local authority does not have to bid with subsidies to retain a
team, then the proliferation of tax break (as opposed to direct grant) subsidies is also weakened.
For instance, whereas a team would find value in having a public body exempt from property
taxes hold a stadium, a local government in England would seem to have far less pressure to lose
part of its tax base than its American counterpart.
Even if a club could persuade a local authority that a new facility could create economic
gains in excess of waived property taxes and this break did not offend EU state aid law, this has a
different cost in the UK system of land value taxation. Whereas in the US and Canada, most
publicly held real property is tax exempt, in the UK’s ratable value system takes into account
more than the value of land and improvements typically assessed and taxed in North America
and exemptions are limited to categories defined at the national level.65 Instead, the business
ratable value is intended to estimate the market value of the premises’ annual rent.66 Applied to
stadiums, this translates to the estimated cost of replacing the stadium as well as the club’s
income and ability to pay. In recent years the setting of business rates for a five year period has
also been a source of contention from clubs in the relegation zone.67 With club revenues highly
reliant on television rights from the Premier League, if a team is relegated after their rates are set
based upon Premier League income, the tax bill can become a significant burden. As clubs have
proven adept at carrying forward losses to avoid large corporate tax bills, ratable value often
serves as their largest source of tax payment, with larger clubs with facilities on more valuable
land paying in the range of £2 million to £4 million per year.68
For ownership structures, a primary consequence of business rates is that they are not on
their face avoidable through leasing a facility – someone will have to pay. Still, West Ham has
leveraged bargaining power to ensure that the E20, the public corporation tasked with the legacy
management of London Stadium, pays roughly 80 percent of the ratable value.69 Here is the
primary instance of a Premier League club acting in much the same way as a North American
club extracting subsidy from a public body – instead of the leverage being the potential departure
of the club from a city, the bargaining power was derived from the prospect of the stadium being
a white elephant if a Premier League tenant was not found.
65

See Local Government Business Rates, UK GOVERNMENT VALUATION OFFICE AGENCY,
https://www.gov.uk/topic/local-government/business-rates (Last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
66
Id.
67
Business Rates System Scores Own Goal Yet Again, COLLIERS (May 9, 2018), https://www.colliers.com/engb/uk/insights/property-news/2018/0509-business-rates-system-scores-own-goal-yet-again.
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Id.
69
Exclusive: Spurs Top The Tax Table, ALTUS GROUP (June 2019),
https://property.altusgroup.com/2019/06/exclusive-spurs-top-the-tax-table/.

186

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 16, Issue 1

In the United States however, publicly owned stadiums are the norm. This is reflective of
economic incentives arising from divergent regulatory decisions. Namely, American legislators
and courts have chosen to protect collective bargaining through making labor law the primary
arena of labor dispute resolution instead of antitrust law.70 In turn, this has protected leagues
from antitrust scrutiny of what may otherwise be anticompetitive and cartel-like behavior.71 With
the monopoly power of leagues intact, the artificial suppression of team supply pits cities and
regions in competition with one another to attract and retain teams.72 This competition is perhaps
most visibly operationalized through public stadium subsidies. Where stadiums are heavily
publicly subsidized as a percentage of capital cost,73 there is a high likelihood of public
ownership.74 Where there is a high gross public subsidy cost,75 a public authority is the
overwhelmingly used holding vehicle.76
The two primary advantages to stadium-related public authorities are interrelated: first, to
access federally tax-exempt bonds for construction, and second, to limit financial risk to general
state or local revenues. In the US, state and local government bonds are generally exempt from
federal taxation.77 Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a stadium bond is classified as private and
non-exempt if it meets two conditions: a nongovernmental entity uses over 10 percent of bond
funds, and directly or indirectly used business property secures over 10 percent of debt service.78
Effectively, not meeting the second condition is the only way where a stadium bond can remain
exempt.79 To surmount this hurdle, a state or local government will have to finance 90 percent of
the facility and these repayment sources cannot be linked to privately created revenue.80 This
means that venue gross cost is minimized if it is overwhelmingly funded by the state or local
government.81
If a facility is to be publicly owned, a public authority is secondly an effective means to
shield state or local treasuries from default and other risks. In some cases, the inverse may apply
where holding the stadium within a public authority protects the stadium asset from a poorly
managed state or local government. However other jurisdictions are more willing to bear the risk
to general revenues and debt ratings as bonds backed by general revenues can often obtain a
lower interest rate.82 This willingness to accept risk can explain some instances where a stadium
is directly held by a local government. Finally, public authorities can be neutral holding vehicles
where multiple levels of government (municipal, county, state) make significant financial
contributions.
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Roberts, supra note 44.
Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989).
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Additionally, public authorities are a way to avoid sales or value-added taxes on personal
seat licenses and sponsorships,83 the former being a common means of team contributions for
capital costs. Likewise, public authorities are exempt from property taxes, meaning that a tenant
may save tens of millions a year relative to holding the stadium privately. This is again
contrasted with England, where stadiums are locally taxed on the tenant’s business ratable value
that is distinguishable from a land value tax.
Finally, a public authority can sometimes be a way to circumvent state law requiring
referenda for major capital project funding, or open meetings and records laws. With the former,
this can see public funding procured despite substantial public opposition that would make a
referenda difficult to pass, or overcome the failure of a ballot measure. With the latter, the
mechanics and operations of ongoing subsidies can be obscured from public view and
accountability.
As for teams, unless they have overwhelmingly self-funded the stadium, franchise
owners are typically content to be tenants.84 This allows teams to separate a highly lucrative
league business from being responsible for maintenance and ongoing capital expenses for lightly
used buildings. Unlike many arenas that are used for over 200 events per year, the size and
exposure to elements of NFL stadiums limits the number of concerts and other events.
Within the same country however, MLS stadiums demonstrate somewhat different
dynamics. Relative to the NFL, there are two primary differences in MLS stadium holding
structures. First, a far greater percentage of soccer specific stadiums are privately held.85 Second,
the publicly held soccer specific stadiums are overwhelmingly owned by municipalities, whereas
public NFL stadiums are mostly held by public authorities.86 The explanations of these
differences are interrelated. With the former, NFL stadiums are far more costly endeavors
(generally anywhere from five to ten times more expensive),87 meaning that any single
municipality is less likely to be able to afford the capital costs without assistance from senior
jurisdictions. NFL teams are also far more culturally valuable to cities than clubs in the relatively
nascent MLS – the pressure on politicians to extend subsidies to retain or attract a NFL team are
seemingly greater, supported by the significantly higher public gross and capital contributions.88
Still as MLS has grown in popularity, the league has been increasingly effective in extracting
soccer specific stadiums as the price of hosting a club.89
However, the significantly higher gross cost of NFL stadiums increases the attractiveness
of both federally tax-exempt bonds and the lower borrowing costs that senior jurisdictions can
often access. These senior jurisdictions can also offer more significant revenue streams not
connected to the business of the facility in order to keep bonds tax exempt in the first place. On
the other hand, less expensive MLS stadiums can be more easily funded by single municipalities
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or ownership groups. This leads into the latter structural difference concerning how public
stadiums are held. The reduced need for tax exempt bonds removes much of the impetus for
multi-jurisdiction involvement and sheltering risk separate from general revenues, changing the
public authority cost-benefit equation (i.e., an authority might make more sense for an $800
million stadium, but not an $80 million stadium).
Moving to Canada, there is a similarly high incidence of public stadium ownership.90
However, there are somewhat different incentives for stadium governance structures in Canada
than in the US. First, there are no incentives created by tax exempt bonds. Instead, the teams and
leagues involved for the most part have limited financial means, while the public parties are
willing to finance the facility, perhaps seeing the stadium as having some value as a public or
social good, or as a political tool.91 With these facilities, the similar system of land value taxation
in Canada to the US means that public or public university ownership of a stadium allows for a
property tax exemption.
Canada also shares some special antitrust protection for professional sports with the US.
Indeed, Canada goes further than the US in that federal statute makes special provision for
professional sports leagues that has the effect of providing preferential treatment for sports
leagues relative to other businesses conducting prospectively anticompetitive behavior. Section
48 of the Canadian Competition Act makes the standard of violation for “[c]onspiracy relating to
professional sport” that of unreasonably limiting opportunities.92 This standard includes
arrangements concerning “the granting and operation of franchises in the league.”93 Compared to
the general prohibition against arrangements between competitors in section 45 of the Act, sports
leagues have far more leeway to show that their conduct is not unreasonable, and are not subject
to the presumption of anticompetitive behavior in section 45.94
Canada, however, may share its greatest and most striking similarities with Australia. In
both countries, the overwhelming proportion of stadiums are publicly owned,95 although
Australia lacks university ownership. Likewise, the large stadiums in major cities are debatably
beyond the financial means of primary tenants, and the primary tenants are second tier
professional leagues relative to giants such as the NFL or Premier League (the CFL and MLS in
Canada, the AFL, A-League, Rugby Union/League, and Big Bash Cricket League in Australia).
While many AFL clubs run a healthy surplus96 – in some instances driven by gambling revenue –
the club governance structure demanding the reinvestment of profits into development of the
game, is not the most amenable to financing stadium construction worth hundreds of millions
compared to the billionaire ownership found in the NFL and Premier League.
Instead, the public sector at the state level has accepted the primary financial burden of
stadium development and ownership, whether directly or through purpose-built authorities. In
Canada however, universities are owners of (or partners in) stadiums in three cities, a structure
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absent from Australia.97 As for the motivation behind stadium construction, the distribution is
comparable to Canada – each country has multiple stadiums arising out of mega events (such as
the Olympics), a proportion that are renovated legacy facilities, and a remainder that are
specifically constructed for two sports. Also, neither country has the American incentive of taxexempt bonds to drive structural arrangements. However, Australia mirrors the US insofar as
stadiums are commonly held by state level public authorities.98
Australia also shares a similar competition law framework to Canada. However, in
Australia there is no parallel provision in the Competition and Consumer Act99 to section 48 of
the Canadian Competition Act. Thus, the issue of monopoly sports leagues, such as the AFL and
A-League, has been left to the courts. As the Competition and Consumer Act is relatively recent
(2010) legislation, there has only been one address of the Act in the sports league context by the
Full Federal Court of Australia. In this case, a commitment agreement to keep rugby teams from
jumping to a new rival league was viewed by the Court on appeal as an illegal collective
boycott.100

B. Ancillary Real Estate Development
One of the more noticeable trends in stadium development has been the onset of team
controlled or related real estate development ancillary to venues. Indeed, such projects have been
seen in all the leagues covered in this article. Thus, it is worth evaluating the issue of whether
there is a potential relationship between legal aspects of stadium holding structures and ancillary
real estate opportunities. Ancillary development connected to the presence of the stadium was
deemed present or absent through the author’s analysis of Google Maps and satellite imagery, as
well as searching of news media, club sources, and financial records to ascertain a relationship
with club ownership parties.
In England, 13 stadiums have ancillary commercial or residential real estate development
meeting the standard of the author’s review. Seven of these developments are controlled by
parties also holding clubs. While the latter category includes well publicized team driven
developments such as those by Arsenal and Tottenham, there are also several stadiums that have
seen retail parks developed nearby that share parking and road infrastructure with stadiums.
Others have seen hotels, apartments, movie theatres, or some combination of the above. In some
lesser known projects, such as Reading, Bolton and Derby, club ownership have been leading
partners in the real estate. With Manchester City, its owners’ £1 billion real estate partnership to
transform swaths of former industrial land near the stadium into 6,000 homes101 is debatably a
more significant business venture than many Premier League clubs.
In terms of stadium ownership structure, Arsenal and Tottenham, large clubs with major
neighborhood developments own their stadiums and clubs as separate subsidiaries of a larger
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holding company that also has separate real estate development companies. The story is much
the same with Manchester City, except for the stadium being leased from the city. Similarly,
smaller clubs with ancillary interests either have several subsidiaries under a central holding
company, or both the club and stadium in a single holding company and the real estate interests
separately.
To use the example of Arsenal, the holding company wholly owns twelve subsidiaries for
club-related businesses, including distinct companies for each of the club, the stadium, and the
real estate development of the former stadium.102 The holding company and operating subsidiary
structure has a number of prospective advantages. First, risks are contained to separate aspects of
the business and assets in one area (such as a stadium) are not subject to lawsuits or finance
defaults in another. Second, are the tax benefits, which in the UK include deferred taxation on
dividends paid to the holding company and a strong network of double taxation treaties,103 both
aspects which may be appealing to Arsenal’s beneficial owners.
In the US, the dominance of stadium ownership by public bodies does not translate to less
ancillary real estate development. The NFL has eight stadiums with related ancillary
development, five of which have a direct club role. Three of the latter five are around stadiums
owned by public authorities, with a fourth being the city/county joint ownership of Lambeau
Field.104 Only Gillette Stadium and the Patriot Place retail development are privately owned
alongside the team in the Kraft Group holding company. The remaining stadiums with ancillary
development independent from club interests are held by two public authorities and a county. In
each instance, the stadium was intended as a spur for ancillary mixed-use development that was
eventually delivered on, although sometimes decades after stadium completion (such as in
Hamilton County/Cincinnati).
In MLS there are eight stadiums with related real estate development, four of which are
club controlled.105 With the latter four, there are two cities (if the District of Columbia is
classified as a city), a county, and LLC directly holding the stadium and club operating rights.
Four other stadiums do not have club involvement in ancillary development. In both categories,
there have been mixed results – significant planned and phased developments in Colorado and
San Jose that are mostly being delivered on, while the strongest construction may be seen in
Frisco, Texas, without club participation. In San Jose, the ancillary opportunities were seen as
sufficiently lucrative for the club ownership to proceed without any direct stadium subsidies. In
Frisco, the suburb had to compete with subsidies against neighboring jurisdictions to be the
stadium host in the first place, but also implemented a long term real estate development strategy
around the facility that has transformed a rural area into a new mixed-use city center over 15
years.106 Meanwhile, the lands surrounding the stadium in Commerce City, Colorado, will see a
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blend of public (a new town center complex) and significant phased private development107 –
while sports and real estate magnate Stan Kroenke sought subsidies for a stadium through
competition within a region, he also desired land for a major commercial development.
As pertaining to stadium holding structures, the aim across US leagues seems to be to
obtain public subsidies and leasing a publicly owned stadium on terms that contractually shift
risks and costs away from a club, but proceeding privately if the venue can be financially viable.
In a number of these privately owned stadium contexts, team controlled ancillary development
has played a significant role in creating a positive value proposition for the stadium from the
club’s perspective. For both American leagues covered, this value includes a revenue source that
does not have to be included in league-wide revenue sharing agreements.108 The nature of
stadium type may also influence financial viability – while a cavernous and expensive NFL
stadium that is usable for a limited number of events may be a harder to profit from proposition,
a MLS stadium with lessened footprint and more concert potential can not only be a better
investment from a stadium revenue perspective, but also make the ancillary development
opportunity more lucrative through a more consistent influx of traffic.
Likewise, many instances where significant ancillary development has occurred have
either been in low density suburbs (like Frisco or Commerce City) or blighted areas of core
cities. In both cases eminent domain, already consolidated ownership, and the acquisition of tax
default properties by land banks have allowed for assembly to precede master-planned
development. Assembly combined with low rates of occupation allow for zoning law
amendments to further contribute to the value proposition for a club in either the public or
privately owned facility scenario. In Commerce City for instance, part of the appeal for Kroenke
was likely blank slate where density and uses could be planned with the help of a cooperative
local government.
Canada has only seen one instance of club-related ancillary stadium development
(Ottawa). Here the renovation of a publicly owned stadium and ancillary development was part
of a comprehensive plan to transform what was viewed as an underutilized neighborhood, as
well as create a facility sufficient to facilitate the return of Canadian football to Ottawa. Perhaps
more interesting has been the aggressive strategy of in-house real estate development in
Vancouver by the PavCo public authority to recoup BC Place renovation costs through ancillary
development.109 The ability of a provincial corporation to potentially exempt itself both from
local property taxes and zoning restrictions, as well as gain access to supply limited casino
licenses, has made the development in theory far more lucrative than what the private sector
could achieve on the same lands.
The Australian leagues examined however seem more limited on the club-related
ancillary development front. With the AFL (and NRL sharing the same structure), the tax-free
non-profit club holding structures would seem to explain the lack of club-related ancillary real
estate development. Although the non-profit structure has still resulted in considerable operating
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surpluses in large part due to gambling revenues, a mixed-use real estate development may be a
leap too far for a tax structure that has seen its share of public criticism.110 A-League teams are
for profit ventures and beneficially owned by individuals, but none of their stadiums are
privately owned.
Even if Australian clubs wished to pursue ancillary development options, the stadiums
themselves are overwhelming owned by state governments or public authorities, and are often
situated in legally dedicated athletics parks where transition to non-athletics use may have more
land use hurdles than with American stadium sites. Where there has been land available for
master planning, major ancillary development projects have instead often come from public
authorities, such as the mixed-use village developed in Sydney’s Olympic Park, or the stadium
anchored Docklands in Melbourne.
C. Limitations
Finally, I should note some limitations. While there may be associative relationships
between club success and stadium holding structures, especially in the Premier League context,
this issue is beyond the scope of the paper. Further research and interviews with stadium
controlling parties may also reveal other tax motivations or historical legacies behind stadium
holding structures. Additionally, stadium ownership is merely one avenue of investigation in the
realm of stadium governance and there is strong potential for further useful work in many related
areas. Some particularly interesting paths of future related research include league structures,
club holding structures, as well as club board governance, financial disclosures, and accounting
practices.

VI. CONCLUSION
This article has evaluated ownership structures of 114 stadiums in England, the US,
Canada, and Australia through the lens of the broader corporate governance law and policy
convergence seen in these jurisdictions. While publicly owned stadiums are the norm in the US,
Canada, and Australia, they are the exception in England. The root explanation for differences
between England and the US concern league monopolies and the threat of relocation if a publicly
financed stadium is not provided. This effect is seemingly stronger in more lucrative and
culturally ingrained leagues such as the NFL, and weaker, but still present in developing leagues
like MLS. Publicly financed stadiums are then owned through various public holding structures
based upon risk allocation and financial cost-benefit as determined at a national level, but also
informed by law and contract.
These legally derived factors include whether and how property taxes and taxes on
personal seat licenses or sponsorships are avoidable, tax exemption of government bonds in the
US, and the potential of ancillary real estate development to create additional revenue streams
outside of league revenue sharing obligations to change a stadium value proposition. In some
cases, public authority ownership can serve to obscure activities from public records and open
meetings laws. In other instances, namely the UK, even if there were more governments willing
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to provide subsidies, European state aid laws for the present effectively restrict subsidies outside
of economic distress, national stadiums, or major cultural events such as the Olympics.
In Canada and Australia, there are similar monopoly leagues to the US, but these leagues
do not extract stadium subsidies in the same way as in America. Canada has seen new and
substantially renovated publicly owned stadiums mostly arise out of local and provincial
governments viewing the stadium as a social good, and provincial governments recognizing an
opportunity to win electoral favor with fans in such places as Regina, Winnipeg, or Hamilton. In
MLS however, three Canadian cities did respond to monopoly incentives to provide a soccer
specific stadium as a condition of successful expansion bids.111
Australia has similar monopoly league power to Canada from an outcome perspective.
While teams in the AFL and A-League relocate, the team licensing system, as well as the lack of
viable alternative hosts willing to provide a superior stadium situation, lessens the extractive
power of relocation best displayed in the US. Yet more often, unlike England (restricted by
European state aid law), and somewhat like Canada, state governments have seen stadiums as
public or social goods. As with stadiums like Canada’s BC Place, Australian state-owned
stadiums are generally multitenant and multiuse.
A commonality between all jurisdictions is the interest in ancillary real estate
development on the part of some teams to improve the value proposition of a stadium. While the
preference is for a publicly subsidized stadium where the club serves as a tenant on favorable
terms, this preference is obtainable depending on the country and the market within the country.
For club owners with the capacity to participate, ancillary development through a separate real
estate company is a potentially lucrative source of revenue beyond event periods. In North
America, these real estate revenues are further shielded from league revenue sharing. For some
governments where clubs lack the potential or interest to develop property, the stadium can serve
as a planning tactic to develop new land value tax revenues to recoup subsidy costs. For other
governments with more limited means to directly subsidize stadiums out of pocket, their legal
tools to assemble blighted lands such as eminent domain and land banking, as well as property
tax abatements can close financial feasibility gaps.
One other legal component present in each of the US, Canada, and Australia, but not
England, is a strong federal structure. Considering the substantial role played by state or
provincial governments in stadium finance and ownership in these countries, as well as the
provision of public goods more generally, the constitutionally derived roles of sub-federal
governments seem to contribute to the outcomes described in this paper.
More broadly though, despite a move towards convergence in other legal and governance
spheres, this article has shown that different political, regulatory, and economic incentives,
grounded largely through law, have led to somewhat divergent stadium holding structures. These
structures can be seen as a spectrum. At one end English stadiums, represented through the
Premier League, are overwhelmingly privately owned by the same ultimate controlling parties as
their resident clubs. At the other, American NFL stadiums are almost all publicly owned, with
state level public authorities being the most common holding vehicle. Still, within these national
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realities, a number of legally grounded influences are seen across borders, namely the structuring
of club-related holdings to best fit within tax, competition, land use, public authority, and public
information laws, as well as internal league contracts.

